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CZE - Věra S/M (pasivní sledovací systém)

     
Název:
Name:
Věra S/M
Originální název:
Original Name:
Věra S/M
Kategorie:
Category:
pasivní sledovací systém
Výrobce:
Producer:
ERA, Pardubice
Období výroby:
Production Period:

DD.MM.2002-DD.MM.2008 (?)
Vyrobeno kusů:
Number of Produced:
10 souprav / 10 sets
Prototyp vyroben:
Prototype Built:
DD.MM.1995 zkoušky funkčního vzoru / tests of technology demonstrator
Obsluha:
Crew:
~15
Složení:
Composition:
AČR / Czech Army:
střední stanoviště / central workplace
- vyhodnocovací pracoviště ESC / ESC evaluation workplace: Tatra 815-2 ARMAX CTS + kontejnerová karoserie KSSK / KSSK container shelter
- střední přijímací stanice CRS / CRS central receiver station: AN-17
- logistický kontejner RSC/C-0 / RSC/C-0 logistic container: Tatra 815-2 ARMAX CTS + kontejnerová karoserie KSSSK / KSSSK container shelter


3x boční stanoviště / 3x side workplace
- logistický kontejner RSC/S-1,2,3 / RSC/S-1,2,3 logistic container: 3x Tatra 815-2 ARMAX CTS + KSSSK container shelter
- 3x boční přijímací stanice SRS / 3x SRS side receiver station: 3x AN-17


doprovodná vozidla / support vehicles
- vozidlo pro rekognoskaci a opravy / vehicle for reconnaissance and repairs: Land Rover Defender 110 RO
- mobilní pracoviště s výnosným zobrazením / mobile workplace with portable display: Land Rover Defender 110 VZ
Uživatelské státy:
User States:



1)
...
Poznámka:
Note:
1) pouze pro zkušební účely
Zdroje:
Sources:
https://www.elektronickyboj.army.cz/
URL : https://www.valka.cz/CZE-Vera-S-M-pasivni-sledovaci-system-t22532#534046Verze : 5
MOD
Věra S/M


Komplet Věra S/M je určen pro vyhledávání, identifikaci a sledování vzdušných, pozemních a námořních cílů. Pasivní sledovací systém Věra-S/M je řešen jako čtyř poziční časově-hyperbolický (TDOA) pasivní sledovací systém, který umožňuje příjem a zpracování impulsních radiolokačních signálů, kódů odpovědí SSR módů 3/A, C, 1, 2 (dále kódy SIF), kódů odpovědí SSR módu S a signálů DME / TACAN.


Věra S/M se skládá ze čtyř přijímacích stanic (přívěsů s trojdílným teleskopickým stožárem AN-17) – střední (CRS) a tří bočních (SRS), vyhodnocovací kontejnerové karoserie ESC a čtyř logistických kontejnerových karoserií RSC umístěných u jednotlivých přijímacích stanic. Kontejnerová karoserie ESC je umístěna na středním stanovišti. Logistické karoserie RSC slouží k uložení záložních dílů, k zabezpečení provozuschopnosti a pro zajištění odpočinku obsluhy. Kontejnerové karoserie jsou přepravovány vozidly T815-2 ARMAX CTS. Součástí systému provozovaného AČR jsou dále dvě terénní vozidla Land Rover Defender 110 RO (pro rekognoskaci a opravy) a Land Rover Defender 110 VZ (mobilní pracoviště s výnosným zobrazením).


Zavedení do výzbroje AČR:
- první poloprovozní systém: 2003 (převzat v březnu 2003)
- první kompletní systém: 2004


Ve výzbroji AČR:
březen 2003 - 4. prapor EB
1.4. 2003 - 30.9. 2005 - 53. centrum PS a EB
1.10. 2005 - 30.9. 2007 - 531. středisko pasivních systémů
1.10. 2007 - 31.12. 2010 - 531. prapor pasivních systémů
od 1.1.2011 - 532. prapor elektronického boje



Technicko-taktická data
- kapacita sledování: 200 cílů
- frekvenční rozsah: 1 - 18 GHz
- dosah: 450 km ve 120° sektoru
- přesnost: 50 - 300 m




KSSSK - kontejnerová střední skříňová sendvičová karoserie pro zástavbu pracovišť RSC/C-0,1,2,3 a ESC
Pohotovostní hmotnost: 2 600 kg
Užitečné zatížení: 3 400 kg
Celková hmotnost: 6 000 kg


Vnější rozměry:
- délka: 4 810 mm
- šířka: 2 446 mm
- výška: 2 378 mm


Vnitřní rozměry:
- délka: 4 720 mm
- šířka: 2 356 mm
- výška: 2 000 mm


Provozní podmínky: -30°C až +44°C


Zdrojové jednotky:
- veřejná síť 3x400 V / 50 Hz
- 2 ks baterie AKB 12 V 180 Ah


Doba nouzového provozu: 2,5 h (na plně nabité baterie AKB)
CZE - Věra S/M (pasivní sledovací systém) -


URL : https://www.valka.cz/CZE-Vera-S-M-pasivni-sledovaci-system-t22532#125888Verze : 2
MOD
Složení systému Věra S/M


Střední stanoviště
- vyhodnocovací karoserie ESC
- přívěs AN-17 se stožárem a anténní jednotkou
- logistická karoserie RSC/C-0


3x boční stanoviště
- logistická karoserie RSC/S-1,2,3
- přívěs AN-17 se stožárem a anténní jednotkou


Doprovodné automobily
- Land Rover Defender LR110 RO (pro rekognoskaci a opravy)
- Land Rover Defender LR110 VZ (mobilní pracoviště s výnosným zobrazením)
CZE - Věra S/M (pasivní sledovací systém) - ESC kontejner (MO ČR)

ESC kontejner (MO ČR)
URL : https://www.valka.cz/CZE-Vera-S-M-pasivni-sledovaci-system-t22532#131582Verze : 0
MOD
Snímek ze slavnostního předání prvního plně provozního systému Věra S/M, které proběhlo v úterý 7. prosince 2004 na letišti v Českých Budějovicích. Tato Věra S/M byla později zavedena do výzbroje Roty A ze sestavy 531. střediska pasivních systémů.
CZE - Věra S/M (pasivní sledovací systém) - (MO ČR - www.army.cz)

(MO ČR - www.army.cz)
URL : https://www.valka.cz/CZE-Vera-S-M-pasivni-sledovaci-system-t22532#85233Verze : 0
MOD
Části středního stanoviště systému Věra S/M (vyhodnocovací karoserie ESC a logistická karoserie RSC/C-0) s anténním přívěsem AN-17 a doprovodným vozidlem Land Rover Defender 110, září 2005.
CZE - Věra S/M (pasivní sledovací systém) - Land Rover Defender 110

Land Rover Defender 110
CZE - Věra S/M (pasivní sledovací systém) - Tatra T815-2 ARMAX 4x4

Tatra T815-2 ARMAX 4x4
CZE - Věra S/M (pasivní sledovací systém) - Ubytovací kontejner RSC/C-0 a vyhodnocovací kontejner ESC

Ubytovací kontejner RSC/C-0 a vyhodnocovací kontejner ESC
CZE - Věra S/M (pasivní sledovací systém) - Pátrač Věra-S/M

Pátrač Věra-S/M
CZE - Věra S/M (pasivní sledovací systém) - Pátrač Věra-S/M

Pátrač Věra-S/M
URL : https://www.valka.cz/CZE-Vera-S-M-pasivni-sledovaci-system-t22532#128563Verze : 2
Vyhodnocovací kontejner a anténní přívěs v přepravním stavu
Pardubice, areal firmy ERA, 31.3.2008
CZE - Věra S/M (pasivní sledovací systém) - zdroj: vlastní archív

zdroj: vlastní archív
CZE - Věra S/M (pasivní sledovací systém) - zdroj: vlastní archív

zdroj: vlastní archív
CZE - Věra S/M (pasivní sledovací systém) - zdroj: vlastní archív

zdroj: vlastní archív
URL : https://www.valka.cz/CZE-Vera-S-M-pasivni-sledovaci-system-t22532#250011Verze : 0
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Skládání části s teleskopickým stožárem, v pozadí vlevo kontejner ESC
Pardubice, areal firmy ERA, 1.8.2008
CZE - Věra S/M (pasivní sledovací systém) - zdroj: vlastní archív

zdroj: vlastní archív
URL : https://www.valka.cz/CZE-Vera-S-M-pasivni-sledovaci-system-t22532#275052Verze : 0
MOD
Ukotvený, částečně vztyčený (nevytažený) na dvoře firmy ERA


Pardubice 5.8.2008
CZE - Věra S/M (pasivní sledovací systém) - zdroj: vlastní archív

zdroj: vlastní archív
URL : https://www.valka.cz/CZE-Vera-S-M-pasivni-sledovaci-system-t22532#275417Verze : 0
MOD
Vojenské přehlídky dne 28.10. 2008 v Praze se zúčastnilo i jedno boční pracoviště RSC/S-3 (T815-2 ARMAX VPZ 013 13-48, anténní přívěs VPZ 464 92-87) z výzbroje Roty A 531. praporu pasivních systémů podřízeného 53. brigádě pasivních systémů a elektronického boje.
CZE - Věra S/M (pasivní sledovací systém) -


CZE - Věra S/M (pasivní sledovací systém) -


URL : https://www.valka.cz/CZE-Vera-S-M-pasivni-sledovaci-system-t22532#289161Verze : 0
MOD
Vyhodnocovací kontejner od prvního "poloprovozního" kompletu Věra S/M (přepravník T815-2 ARMAX VPZ 583 21-09), Rota B 531. střediska pasivních systémů, červen 2006.
CZE - Věra S/M (pasivní sledovací systém) -


CZE - Věra S/M (pasivní sledovací systém) -


CZE - Věra S/M (pasivní sledovací systém) -


CZE - Věra S/M (pasivní sledovací systém) -


CZE - Věra S/M (pasivní sledovací systém) -


CZE - Věra S/M (pasivní sledovací systém) -


CZE - Věra S/M (pasivní sledovací systém) -


CZE - Věra S/M (pasivní sledovací systém) -


CZE - Věra S/M (pasivní sledovací systém) -


URL : https://www.valka.cz/CZE-Vera-S-M-pasivni-sledovaci-system-t22532#290938Verze : 0
MOD
Logistická karoserie RSC/C-0 od "provozního" kompletu, 53. centrum PS a EB, září 2005.
CZE - Věra S/M (pasivní sledovací systém) -


CZE - Věra S/M (pasivní sledovací systém) -


CZE - Věra S/M (pasivní sledovací systém) -


CZE - Věra S/M (pasivní sledovací systém) -


CZE - Věra S/M (pasivní sledovací systém) -


CZE - Věra S/M (pasivní sledovací systém) -


CZE - Věra S/M (pasivní sledovací systém) -


CZE - Věra S/M (pasivní sledovací systém) -


CZE - Věra S/M (pasivní sledovací systém) -


CZE - Věra S/M (pasivní sledovací systém) -


CZE - Věra S/M (pasivní sledovací systém) -


CZE - Věra S/M (pasivní sledovací systém) -


CZE - Věra S/M (pasivní sledovací systém) -


CZE - Věra S/M (pasivní sledovací systém) -


CZE - Věra S/M (pasivní sledovací systém) -


URL : https://www.valka.cz/CZE-Vera-S-M-pasivni-sledovaci-system-t22532#291222Verze : 0
MOD
Vyhodnocovací kontejner od prvního "poloprovozního" kompletu Věra S/M (přepravník T815-2 ARMAX VPZ 120 15-03), Rota B 531. střediska pasivních systémů, září 2007.
CZE - Věra S/M (pasivní sledovací systém) -


URL : https://www.valka.cz/CZE-Vera-S-M-pasivni-sledovaci-system-t22532#309673Verze : 0
MOD
Vyhodnocovací karoserie na podvozku kontejnerového přepravníku s hákovým nakladačem na podvozku T815-2 s kontejnerovým nakladačem CTS od kompletu Věra S/M dodaného v roce 2008 do Malajsie. Anténní přívěsy téhož systému jsou uvedeny na fotkách výše.
CZE - Věra S/M (pasivní sledovací systém) - (autor neznámý, via Internet)

(autor neznámý, via Internet)
URL : https://www.valka.cz/CZE-Vera-S-M-pasivni-sledovaci-system-t22532#327670Verze : 1
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Kontejnerový přepravník a anténní přívěs od kompletu pro Malajsii v provozu u uživatele.

Fotografie: via Pavel M.

CZE - Věra S/M (pasivní sledovací systém) -


URL : https://www.valka.cz/CZE-Vera-S-M-pasivni-sledovaci-system-t22532#327747Verze : 0
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Komplet Věra S/M od 531. střediska pasivních systémů na cvičení Spartan Hammer 06, které proběhlo v období 1. – 17. listopadu 2006 na letecké základně Andravida v Řecku.


Fotografie: ΥΠΕΘΑ

CZE - Věra S/M (pasivní sledovací systém) -


URL : https://www.valka.cz/CZE-Vera-S-M-pasivni-sledovaci-system-t22532#371834Verze : 0
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Věra a Wikileaks


V souvislosti s uvažovanými dodávkami kompletů Věra do asijských zemí se na nechvalně proslulých stránkách Wikileaks objevily následující americké depeše zabývající se touto problematikou.




C O N F I D E N T I A L PRAGUE 001870, CREATED: 2004-12-23

SIPDIS

STATE FOR NP/ENCP, INR/SPM, PM/RSAT, EUR/PRA, EUR/NCE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/22/2014
TAGS: ETTC KSTC PARM PREL PINR EZ PK
SUBJECT: CZECH MFA SOLICITS US OPINION ON POTENTIAL SALE OF
PASSIV...



SUBJECT: CZECH MFA SOLICITS US OPINION ON POTENTIAL SALE OF PASSIVE RADAR TO PAKISTAN
REF: A. PRAGUE 1830
¶B. PRAGUE 1064
¶C. STATE 172966
Classified By: Deputy Political Counselor Mark Canning for reasons 1.4 (a) (b) (c) and (g)

¶1. THIS IS AN ACTION REQUEST. SEE PARA 7

¶2. (C) As foreshadowed in Reftel A, the Czech Ministry of Foreign Affairs is, for the second time this year, soliciting US opinion on the possible sale of a Czech-produced passive radar system to Pakistan.

¶3. (C) As in the previous case, dealt with in Reftels B and C, this MFA request is based on a request from the Czech firm ERA to begin preliminary marketing discussions with the Air Force of Pakistan. Unlike the previous case, the proposed sale would not involve the passive system VERA-E, but an earlier, less powerful model of passive radar, the ASDD-01.

¶4. (C) Reftel C describes U.S. concerns over a possible reexport of the VERA-E to China as the primary reason for opposing a VERA-E sale to Pakistan. The U.S. concern played an important role in the decision by the GOCR in July to deny ERA permission to move forward with marketing the system to Pakistan. The firm has recently approached the MFA with new information about the sale of a Swedish radar system, the Erieye, to Pakistan. The Erieye is made by Ericsson Microwave Systems and is described as an active, phased-array pulse-Doppler radar that can be used for Airborne Early Warning and Control Systems. The firm provided news reports stating Pakistan will purchase seven copies of the Eireye.

¶5. (C) The firm argues that the ASDD-01 is based on the same technology as the Erieye. In addition the firm has offered to discuss reexport concerns. The firm made the suggestions that GPS equipment be included in the hardware to identify its location, and that unannounced spot checks of the equipment be agreed to in any potential contract.

¶6. (C) Comment: In presenting the formal request for USG views on the proposed sale during a meeting on Dec 22, Czech MFA staff pointed out the huge symbolic benefits of any sale, even a non VERA sale. The GOCR, and the MFA in particular, which were publicly criticized for halting earlier requests to market VERA, are now under renewed public and private pressure from the politically-influential ERA to license exports. As MFA staff did not hesitate to point out, good news on a high-profile sale like this would boost the ability of the weak Czech government to win approval for controversial policy moves, such as the further extension of Czech troops in Iraq. End Comment.

¶7. Please provide response in the next 90 days, if possible, to the Czech request for Washington advisory opinion.
CABANISS


____________________
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PRAGUE 000106, CREATED: 2005-01-21

SIPDIS

STATE FOR NP/ENCP, INR/SPM, PM/RSAT, EUR/PRA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/05/2015
TAGS: ETTC KSTC PARM PREL PINR PK EZ


SUBJECT: ADDITIONAL TECHNICAL INFORMATION ON POTENTIAL SALE OF CZECH PASSIVE SURVEILLANCE SYSTEM TO PAKISTAN
REF: A. 04 PRAGUE 1870

¶B. 04 SECSTATE 212634
Classified By: Deputy Political Counselor Mark Canning for reasons 1.4 (a) (b) (c)

¶1. (C) Reftel reported the request of the Czech government for the U.S. government´s opinion on the potential sale of a passive surveillance system (PSS) to the Air Force of Pakistan. This cable offers additional technical and background information on the system. Note: ref A mistakenly made reference to a 90-day timeframe for receipt of USG views on possible VERA sales. In fact, our commitment to the GOCR (ref B) was to undertake best efforts to provide our views within 30 days. MFA officials are asking about when they can expect our views (ref A dated Dec 23, 2004). We have explained that the holiday period could delay our reply. However, given recent MFA cooperation on USG request to accelerate licenses for a number of weapons exports to Iraq, Afghanistan and the U.S., it is in our continuing interest to be as responsive as possible to the Czech request.

¶2. (C) Three Embassy officers (DAO, PolEc and ODC) met January 19 with four representatives from ERA, the Czech company that produces the passive surveillance system, VERA-E. The company was represented by its CEO, Miroslav Sotona, its Commercial Director Milan Bernard, and two marketing managers for ERA´s military products. The company gave Embassy representatives a 20-minute briefing on the firm´s short history, its civil and military products, and its recent unsuccessful attempts to sell its products in Asia. The company then openly answered all questions for more than 2 hours.

¶3. (C) ERA officials explained that, beginning in the late 90s, ERA initially attempted to market VERA-E to 22 NATO countries and discovered that there was no interest in its military radars. It is now convinced that most NATO countries already have or can afford better, more powerful systems and will never buy VERA. Once ERA realized this, it switched its marketing efforts to Asia, where it quickly found a number of interested buyers. Contract were signed with China and with Vietnam. The firm then discovered that Czech authorities would not approve the applications for export licenses. Altering its strategy, the company decided to do what many western arms manufacturers do: offer one version for allies and a more limited version for sale to non-allies.
This non-NATO version is the ASDD-01. Reftel mistakenly identifies the ASDD-01 as an earlier version of the VERA-E. In fact, the ASDD-01 has never been manufactured. The ASDD-01 would be an intentionally weakened version of the VERA that the company hopes it will be allowed to sell to non-NATO states. The company explained that it tried to reduce the capabilities of VERA to the point where sales to non-NATO states would be politically acceptable, but not so far that the system would no longer be attractive to potential customers

¶4. (C) ASDD-01 stands for Air Situation and Detection Display. The model, which again only exists in theory, would use the same principle as the VERA, time difference of arrival multilateration technique (TODA). It has roughly the same tracking and location capabilities as the VERA-E, but lacks the VERA´s identification, or fingerprinting, capabilities. Both the ASDD-01 and the VERA-E are passive radar systems. Era provided the following explanation of the differences between ASDD and VERA, on paper:
ASDD belongs to the category of ELINT/ESM measures. It is based on the wideband principle of electromagnetic signal location and tracking.
The main differences between the VERA-E and the ASDD are as follows:

- The VERA-E, which in general has been designed for NATO partner countries, as developed by ERA, contains an advanced level of precise identification of electromagnetic signal emitters. The method of identifying such signal emissions is sometimes called finger printing. This identification has to be based on algorithms and hardware technologies, which make possible fine interpulse and intrapulse signal analysis.
This method can help to identify the signal emitter up to the level of a specific radar installed onboard a specific aircraft.

- The ASDD utilizes the type identification of radar emitter.
This kind of identification is based on applied software and hardware equipment. The ASDD´s identification process relies in principle on just interpulse characteristics of the EM pulse signal. Based on this, it is possible to define general types of radar, which might be used on many types of aircraft.
Based on the above principles of emitter identification, it should be clear that the applied system databases are very different. The difference is in the radar parameters, which go into the database, as well the emitter identification based on the system´s database. In general, there is a much simpler database in the ASDD and a more complex database in the VERA-E.

¶5. (C) Regarding measures to prevent reverse engineering or unauthorized copying of its products, company officials explained that 90% of the system´s capacity is in the software, and that source codes would not be delivered to the customer.

¶6. (C) In a ironic twist on traditional marketing presentations, ERA did all it could to call attention to the shortcomings and limitations of its product. The firm pointed out that they still use previous generation analog receivers. They called attention to the fact that VERA-E requires a number of vehicles and masts and is awkward to deploy or move. They noted that VERA-E can only pick up radar emissions, not communications or other electronic signals. In answer to the question, ""what do you see if the plane turns off its radar emitter?"" they said, ""nothing."" ERA also said that it hopes the system the US has purchased and is scheduled to test this fall will produce a ""realistic"" evaluation that destroys some of the myths about the capacity of VERA-E in particular, and passive radar in general. The firm acknowledged that VERA-E had been developed on ""a Czech budget"" and that it did not have the R&D resources that competitive firms such as the Italian firm Marconi or the French firm Thales have, and admitted that one of the main attractions of VERA-E is its price, roughly 5 million US dollars.

¶7. (C) The company also explained that it wasn´t even certain that Pakistan is still interested, but that if permission is granted to market the ASDD-01 in Pakistan, it would have to build an ASSD-01 that could be taken there for testing. If Pakistan was satisfied with the results of the test, production on its order would begin. In 2003 Pakistan expressed interest in buying six radar sets. It is unlikely that the radar sets would be ready before 2006. ERA officials said Pakistan has already signed contracts, worth roughly 1.7 billion US dollars for a more powerful airborne surveilance system ERIEYE. According to ERA officials, the Swedish system incorporates both active and passive technology. ERA officials explained that if Pakistan were to buy the ASDD-01, it would be used as the land component of an integrated air defense system.

¶8. (C) ERA answered all questions that were asked, at length.
The company shared information on prices and acknowledged that although it has had recent success in selling civil radar sets, its goal is to sell military sets as well, where margins are much higher. It was up front about its marketing strategies. ERA also offered to provide more information in the future, should we have additional questions.

¶9. COMMENT (C) If ERA assertions about Erieye´s capabilities are correct, and taking into consideration ERA´s willingness to dumbdown their product, post believes Washington should consider a positive response on the question of the Czech export of the ASDD to Pakistan. Otherwise, the willingness of the Czech MFA to consult with the USG on a voluntary basis could come under attack, and even be put at risk in future cases where we have a strong and direct interest in preventing an export of the more capable VERA-E system, as was the case recently with China. END COMMENT

¶10. (U) Post looks forward to receiving Washington´s advisory opinion.
HILLAS


____________________
C O N F I D E N T I A L PRAGUE 000892, CREATED: 2005-06-13

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/06/2015
TAGS: ETTC KSTC PARM PINR PREL EZ VM PK
SUBJECT: CZECH PROPOSAL FOR PASSIVE RADAR SYSTEM TO VIETNAM RENEWED; DEMO MODEL TO PAKISTAN EXPECTED SOON

REF: A. A:(2004) SECSTATE 172966
¶B. B:PRAGUE 860

Classified By: DEPUTY POLITICAL COUNSELOR MARK CANNING, REASONS 1.4 (B) and (D)

1 (C) Deputy Foreign Minister Jan Winkler told DCM in a June 3rd meeting that the Czech Republic is considering the sale of the passive surveillance system VERA-E, in a simplified non-NATO version, to Vietnam, and would like to consult with the US on this. Winkler explained that French and Swedish exporters have recently expressed interest in Vietnam and that has prompted the Czech firm ERA to renew its own sales efforts there.

¶2. (C) The MFA initially denied this application last Fall (U.S. views on sale given Reftel A). The manufacturer, ERA, withdrew the application, but resubmitted it in March. At that time, the MFA said that its position hadn´t changed and that the sale was not in the interest of the Czech Republic or its allies. ERA said it had new information to present with the resubmission and presented this last week (June 2). Most of the new information involved claims by ERA of sales or proposed sales of similar radar and surveillance equipment to Vietnam by other European states, including Germany, France, Sweden and Poland.

¶3. (C) In a separate June 3rd meeting, Petr Kaiser, head of the MFA´s licensing office, told Embassy Pol-Mil officer that ERA wants to design and sell to Vietnam a non-NATO version of the VERA-E and is ready to consider serious reductions in the capability of the system. The Czech Ministry of Defense, which has been financially supporting VERA for many years, is also, according to Kaiser, considering this.

¶4. (C) Kaiser thought there could be a meeting soon to discuss the concept of a non-NATO VERA-E. He wondered whether the US would like to have some input in the discussion about what capabilities a non-NATO machine might have, or what kind of pre-sales and post-sales safeguards non-NATO transactions might require.

¶5. (C) Kaiser argued that ERA is trying to be a responsible corporation. He revealed that ERA had a board meeting within the last two weeks to discuss the ongoing suit, filed by Czech arms dealer Omnipol, over last year´s canceled license for the sale of VERA-E to China. At that meeting ERA representatives decided to go against Omnipol and not be a party to the suit. Apparently, Kaiser reasoned, some at ERA feel it is not appropriate to sell VERA-E to China at this time.

¶6. (C) Kaiser cautioned that the proposed sale to Vietnam is an issue that is not going to go away anytime soon.

¶7. (C) Meanwhile, in a related matter, Kaiser informed Embassy Pol-mil officer that Pakistan has asked for a model of ERA´s passive surveillance system ASDD to begin testing. The Czechs plan to loan this model, for a couple of weeks. Kaiser said the approval for this loan is in the pipeline and could be given within the next 2 weeks.

¶8. COMMENT: (C) As discussed Reftel B, the Czech MFA has offered assurances that they want to continue consulting with USG on VERA sales. Embassy believes it is in the USG interest to engage the Czechs in a discussion on a non-NATO version of VERA. In December, 2004, the Czech MFA asked for the USG opinion on a proposed Pakistani purchase of a less capable version of VERA. The absence of a USG response has left the Czechs to decide for themselves what technical capabilities are appropriate and what conditions to attach to the sale. Post is aware that the U.S. won´t have the chance to test its own VERA-E until this fall. Nevertheless, post encourages Washington to consider the Czech offer to discuss what modifications might be appropriate for a non-NATO version of the VERA-E.

¶9. ACTION REQUEST: (C) Please indicate Washington´s willingness to begin a technical discussion on a possible non-NATO version of the VERA-E, and Washington´s views on the proposed sale of such a device to Vietnam.
CABANISS


____________________
S E C R E T PRAGUE 001146,CREATED: 2005-08-03

SIPDIS

NOFORN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/18/2015
TAGS: ETTC EZ KSTC PARM PREL PTER VM
SUBJECT: ASDD-01 TO VIETNAM: POINTS DELIVERED, LITTLE
PROGRESS

REF: A. STATE 140227

¶B. PRAGUE 106
¶C. PRAGUE 1104
¶D. STATE 131474
¶E. PRAGUE 892
¶F. 04 PRAGUE 1064

Classified By: Political-Military Officer Brian Greaney for reasons 1.4 (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (g)

1) (S/NF) Summary: The Czech MFA continues to withhold its agreement to the transfer of an ASDD-01 passive surveillance system to Vietnam. MFA contacts acknowledge defense cooperation between China and Vietnam could in theory lead to exchange of military material. It appears the MFA´s opposition will not be effective in the long run, due to counter arguments with the GOCR that proliferation of ASDD-01 technology from Vietnam to China is a technical impossibility. End summary.

2) (S/NF) Pol-Mil off August 2 delivered Ref A points (on U.S. opposition to a Czech sale of an ASDD-01 to Vietnam) to Ministry of Foreign Affairs Director of Common Foreign and Security Policy Petr Kaiser (strictly protect). As intelligence information about military cooperation between China and Vietnam was not authorized for release to the Czechs, Pol-Mil Off provided information gleaned from Google. Kaiser acknowledged his suspicion that the political relationship between China and Vietnam did not preclude the potential for proliferation of military equipment. He mentioned a similar concern had been expressed in EU discussions about the China arms embargo.


3) (S/NF) Kaiser said the MFA, despite deadlines for action, continued to withhold its consent to the transfer. Chinese-Vietnamese relations are within the Czech MFA´s area of expertise in the licensing process. However Kaiser also predicted the MFA would be unable to hold up the deal indefinitely because of arguments by technical experts within the Ministry of Defense that the ASDD-01 system had adequate protections against proliferation. He said the MFA did not have the technical expertise to question the validity of strong assertions by experts in favor of the deal.

4) (S/NF) Comment: We (the USG) have been unable to develop a list of foreign policy reasons applicable to Vietnam that the Czech MFA could use to oppose a transfer. Proponents and opponents of the deal are now divided by a question of fact, rather than policy. MFA concerns are being undermined by assertions within the GOCR that proliferation to China is almost certainly a technical impossibility (limited technical details were reported Ref B). Neither Embassy Prague nor the Czech MFA has the technical expertise to effectively raise doubt about such arguments. We will be asking the USAF-led VERA-E evaluation team currently visiting the Czech Republic for a debrief. While we hope the team will have been able to learn something about ERA´s counterproliferation measures, this is merely a small step in the right direction. Unless we are willing to develop and deliver technical arguments about anti-proliferation safeguards, it is very likely that an ASDD-01 will go to Vietnam. The other alternative is to raise the level at which U.S. objections are delivered. Combining these two tactics, Post again suggests that as part of bilateral U.S.-Czech pol-mil talks tentatively scheduled for the Fall, we should schedule consultations between U.S. technical and policy experts and their Czech counterparts.
CABANISS


____________________
S E C R E T PRAGUE 001363, CREATED: 2005-09-21

SIPDIS

NOFORN

EUR/NCE FOR FICHTE, PM/RSAT FOR BOCKLAGE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/01/2015
TAGS: ETTC EZ KSTC PARM PREL PK
SUBJECT: CZECHS LICENSE A ONE-YEAR VERA SYSTEM LOAN TO PAKISTAN

REF: A. 04 PRAGUE 1235
¶B. 04 STATE 212634
¶C. 04 PRAGUE 1870
¶D. PRAGUE 106
¶E. PRAGUE 313
¶F. PRAGUE 892
¶G. PRAGUE 1104
¶H. PRAGUE 1146
¶I. PRAGUE 1252
¶J. 04 PRAGUE 523

Classified By: Political-Military Officer Brian Greaney for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

1) (S) Czech News agency CTK late September 20 reported the Ministry of Industry and Trade has licensed a lease of the VERA passive surveillance system to Pakistan. This information is slightly different from that previously provided by GOCR sources, which maintained the proposed transfer was a one-year loan, rather than a lease. According to previous discussions with the MFA, the unit would have to be returned to the Czech Republic, even if Pakistan decides to purchase a system. A sale to Pakistan would require a new license application. A history of the circumstances surrounding this deal can be found in Refs A-I.

2) (S) While following up on the news story with the Ministry of Industry and Trade, Post learned that the license was quietly issued Sep 12th. The Ministry´s head of licensing Sep 21st told us he was unhappy that the matter had become public. Under the Czech export-control system, the issuance of a license ends the Czech Governmental involvement in a deal, unless there are some conditions added to the license that require further government oversight. Examples of these would be inspections or proof that nonproliferation measures have been added to a system. The MFA had insisted that such conditions be part of any issuance of a license to Pakistan. Embassy Prague is seeking details of the final conditions that were imposed.

3) (S) In 2004, when the GOCR approved a license for the export of the VERA to China it took high level U.S. intervention to convince then PM Spidla to intervene and prevent the sale (REF J). That event was politically damaging to Spidla, despite the GOCR´s public statement that the intervention was actually based on the EU´s China arms embargo. PM Paroubek, facing elections next year, is not likely to be keen to block a Pakistan deal.
DODMAN


____________________
C O N F I D E N T I A L PRAGUE 001498, CREATED: 2005-10-19

SIPDIS

PM/DTCC - FOR BLUE LANTERN COORDINATOR, EUR/NCE FOR FICHTE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/18/2015
TAGS: KOMC ETTC EZ
SUBJECT: VERA-E - BLUE LANTERN LEVEL 3: PRE-LICENSE END USE
CHECK ON LICENSE 05-967713

REF: A. STATE 175680
¶B. PRAGUE 1363
¶C. 04 PRAGUE 1235
¶D. 04 STATE 212634
¶E. 04 PRAGUE 1870
¶F. PRAGUE 106
¶G. PRAGUE 313
¶H. PRAGUE 892
¶I. PRAGUE 1104
¶J. PRAGUE 1146
¶K. PRAGUE 1252
¶L. 04 PRAGUE 523
¶M. 04 PRAGUE 1355
¶N. 04 PRAGUE 1357
¶O. 04 PRAGUE 1358

Classified By: Political-Military Officer Brian Greaney for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

¶1. (C) Foreign consignee, ERA A.S. (ERA) is familiar to the United States Government. A sample of some of the USG reporting on the company´s systems can be found in Refs B-L.

¶2. (C) Embassy Prague closely follows ERA,s license applications to the GOCR for export of the VERA-E system. During his Sep 2004 visit to Prague, then Deputy Secretary Armitage discussed exports of the VERA-E system with then Prime Minister Stanislav Gross Gross (Ref M), Defense Minister Karel Kuehnl (Ref N), and Foreign Minister Cyril Svoboda (Ref O). Defense Minister Kuehnl specifically asked the Deputy Secretary for assistance in marketing the system to the Baltics (Ref N). Deputy Secretary Armitage thanked Svoboda for the GOCR,s positive response to Secretary Powell,s letter requesting forbearance on VERA-E sales to China and said that the U.S. will be looking for ways to be helpful on other, non-problematic sales (Ref O).
CABANISS


____________________
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 PRAGUE 001657

SIPDIS

FOR EUR DAS MARK PEKALA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/27/2015
TAGS: PREL PGOV ECON EZ
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR EUR DAS PEKALA´S VISIT TO PRAGUE

Classified By: Ambassador William Cabaniss for reasons 1.4 b+d

¶1. (C) Summary: Czechs this month marked the 16th anniversary of the Velvet Revolution. As you will see during your visit this week, the country has embraced a pro-transatlantic foreign policy, with the Czech government and NGOs playing a significant role in efforts to promote democratic transformation in Cuba, Belarus, Iraq and elsewhere. Czech military reform and integration into NATO is well advanced; the Czechs are still struggling to define their niche within the EU. Bilateral relations are healthy, with the question of visa waiver the only contentious issue. The Czech economy is performing very well, with 5% growth and strong investment inflows, despite incomplete structural reforms and persistent corruption. Foreign and economic policy will both be shaped by decisions made by PM Paroubek, whose attention is squarely on elections next June; Paroubek has already redrawn the political landscape by his decision to openly cooperate with the Communist party. We suggest your message during your meetings in Prague focus on three points: (a) we applaud Czech efforts to foster democratic transformations in Cuba, Iraq, Belarus the Balkans and elsewhere; we want to coordinate and support these efforts. (b) we appreciate Czech support for U.S.-led efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan, and our continued cooperation in the field of non-proliferation (c) we are concerned that a more active Communist role in foreign policy (e.g., visits by North Korean and Iranian delegations) shows a puzzling lack of Czech resolve and will introduce irritants into our bilateral cooperation and reduce the active and positive role the CR is playing internationally.

-------------------------------------
The "bulldozer" remakes the landscape
-------------------------------------

¶2. (C) Since he took over as prime minister in April, Jiri Paroubek has repeatedly demonstrated that he deserves his nickname, the bulldozer. He has single-handedly turned around the fortunes of his Social Democratic Party (CSSD), bringing them nearly even with the opposition Civic Democrats (ODS). By dropping the long-standing taboo against openly working with the Communist Party (KSCM) at the national level, Paroubek has dramatically increased his power and bargaining room: he no longer needs to rely on the one-vote majority his formal three-party coalition government enjoys, but instead can fall back on the eleven-vote majority that CSSD and KSCM together can provide; he can push through legislation (like the new union-friendly Labor Code) that his center-right coalition partners oppose but his party´s core voters want; and he can essentially ignore the threat that the Christian Democrats (KDU-CSL) will bring down his government (as it successfully brought down former PM Gross).


¶3. (C) Opinion polls show that Paroubek´s nuanced approach to the third largest party in Parliament -- he will seek the votes of the KSCM, as he would from any party, but he refuses to "formally" cooperate with them (i.e., form an actual coalition) until they reform (primarily by renouncing the crimes of the past and accepting the primacy of transatlantic relations in Czech foreign policy) -- has not cost him any support. Of note: even a committed anti-communist like former President Havel has made clear that he is not opposed to what Paroubek is doing. While the November 17 celebration of the 16th anniversary of the Velvet Revolution brought passionate debate about the Communist party and its legacy, Paroubek clearly feels vindicated in his approach. Last week brought the first sign that Paroubek may have found the limit in how far he can push, when he quickly backed down from a suggestion that the time had come to rescind the Lustration Law that prevents former secret police officials from filling public sector positions.

-------------------------------
What the Communists mean for us
-------------------------------

¶4. (C) Paroubek is described as having a pragmatic, rather than principled, approach to governance. He, and many other senior officials, have assured us repeatedly that whatever political deals Paroubek may cut with KSCM in order to pass bills on social and economic policy, the CSSD will deal only with its coalition partners or ODS on foreign and security policy. However, we have already seen examples of where Paroubek´s cooperation with KSCM had a foreign policy impact. Specifically, last month a DPRK parliamentary delegation visited the CR at the invitation of KSCM Chairman Filip; the delegation visited the Temelin nuclear power plant despite strong objections from the USG and Czech MFA. This week Filip is bringing a group of Iranian parliamentarians to Prague and has tentatively secured a meeting for them with the First Deputy Foreign Minister (a CSSD appointee). During a lunch meeting on November 17, Ambassador told Paroubek that the USG is concerned about the increasing influence of KSCM on foreign policy, as well as their role in promoting economic policy measures that will hurt the investment climate. We need to continue to reinforce this message, so that the pragmatic prime minister realizes there is a cost to his political approach.

----------------------------
A small transatlantic friend
----------------------------

¶5. (C) With the notable exception of the KSCM and a few of the most left-leaning members of CSSD, there is broad agreement across the Czech political spectrum about the importance of transatlantic relations. Likewise, with the notable exception of President Klaus and some (but by no means all) ODS members, Czechs broadly support the EU. Like other Central European states, the CR does not believe the two are incompatible; Czechs appreciate transatlantic ties as a way to balance their relations with Brussels, as well as for the values that they respect in U.S. foreign policy. As a small country, the Czechs are well aware of the need to prioritize their foreign and security policies, and they have identified goals that broadly support USG objectives. They have embraced military reform and specialization within NATO, distinguishing themselves for their NBC and special forces capabilities (the latter will be redeployed in Afghanistan next year). While participating in ESDP (Czechs and Slovaks recently announced they will form their own battlegroup), they have made NATO their clear priority. They have maintained a small but steady presence in Iraq, with nearly 100 military police training Iraq forces near Basra (extension of the deployment for next year is expected to pass easily in December, given the support of the opposition ODS). They give priority focus to the Balkans, where the Czechs have troops in both Bosnia and Kosovo (in the latter leading the multinational brigade in the central region). Government assistance is designed to strengthen civil society in the Balkans, Iraq, Cuba and other countries in transition. Unfortunately, their goal of engaging internationally is not always matched by success in influencing CFSP decisions in Brussels. We can help by encouraging the Czechs to play better and smarter in Brussels.

--------------------------------------------- ---------
Czechs know something about transformational diplomacy
--------------------------------------------- ---------

¶6. (C) One legacy of the forty year struggle against Communist dictatorship, and then of the long tenure of Vaclav Havel as president, is that support for democracy and freedom is a core principle of Czech foreign policy. Foreign Minister Svoboda is an ardent supporter, as is his former deputy Petr Kolar, who assumes his duties as Czech Ambassador to the U.S. this week. The two established a "Transformation Cooperation Unit" within the MFA, that funds programs to support civil society and democratic opposition in Cuba, Belarus, Iraq, and the Balkans, with secondary focus on Moldova and Burma. The MFA cooperates closely in this effort with Czech NGOs, notably People in Need, the largest Czech NGO, whose former director, Tomas Pojar, recently replaced Kolar as Deputy Minister for Bilateral Relations. Beyond their direct assistance, the Czechs try to use their diplomacy to influence EU and UN decisions to support reform, most famously their efforts to maintain an EU common position that supports Cuban peaceful opposition by inviting dissidents to national day celebrations. Former President Havel supports the government effort, through his own work on Cuba, and through inspirational messages he sends, for example to support protesters during last year´s Orange Revolution. We are coordinating with the Czechs through USAID (jointly supporting radio broadcasts to Belarus, for example) and in other ways, but can always do more. With the possibility that Czech foreign policy could becoming more "pragmatic," USG encouragement and support for Czech efforts can help bolster the position of Svoboda and others.

-------------------------------
Just how pragmatic will it get?
-------------------------------

¶7. (C) Paroubek wants Czech foreign policy to promote business interests; there is already an emphasis on rehabilitating economic ties with Russia and other countries to the east. But China is Paroubek´s current focus. After leading a large trade delegation to China in the fall, Paroubek invited Premier Wen Jiabao to visit Prague in early December. The MFA reports tremendous pressure to finalize a new economic agreement in advance of the visit, despite concerns that some of the Chinese demands would run afoul of EU rules. Many Czechs (not least MFA staff) were surprised that Paroubek´s visit to Beijing included no significant mention of continued human rights abuses, and this is not expected to be a prominent topic next month in Prague.

¶8. (C) Perhaps a stronger test of just how pragmatic Czech foreign policy will become is the EU arms embargo on China. According to the MFA, it was only the Czechs and the Danes that prevented the arms embargo from being lifted earlier this year; Czech policy has long urged that the embargo cannot be lifted absent three steps: some human rights improvement, a secure toolbox, and an effective EU dialogue with strategic partners, including the U.S. MFA staff have told us that the Czech position would eventually have to yield to a concerted EU push on this, although with the issue largely dormant for the bulk of Paroubek´s time in office the policy itself has not been tested. Another test is continued Czech coordination on broader non-proliferation goals, notably the VERA-E passive surveillance system. Two years ago the Czechs pulled the plug on a planned VERA-E sale to China, at USG request, and they have since cooperated with us to prevent sales to countries of concern. We need to show our appreciation, and to work closely with the Czechs, to prevent the commercial pull of these sales from outweighing the non-proliferation concerns.

----------------
Visas and visits
----------------

¶9. (C) Committed Czech transatlanticists -- lamenting the inevitable increasing influence of the EU, the general popular disinterest in international affairs and lack of first-hand knowledge about the U.S., and the threat posed by pragmatic policymakers -- are not shy about telling U.S. officials that tangible signs of U.S. appreciation for Czech efforts would facilitate their task of keeping Czech foreign policy consistent. They believe that changing U.S. visa policy for Czechs is far and away the one area that would make a positive impact: ideally adding the CR to the visa waiver program, or at least reducing fees or otherwise making noticeable "improvements" in the application process. Happily, officials like FM Svoboda and new Ambassador Kolar realize that, regardless of the state of Czech preparedness for visa waiver, Congressional action on this is not in the cards at this point; they agree that the most important thing is for the two governments to make progress on the Visa Roadmap, through the Bilateral Consular Working Group (which will next meet on December 7). However, most Czechs -- including some MFA staff -- are not as reasonable. After visas, Kolar and others believe that bilateral visits can best strengthen the position of FM Svoboda and other supporters of current foreign policy. The MFA would like Svoboda to call on Secretary Rice early next year, when he visits the U.S. to formally open a new Czech Consulate in Chicago. You can expect to hear about both of these issues during your visit.
CABANISS


____________________
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 PRAGUE 000046, CREATED: 2006-01-13

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/08/2015
TAGS: PREL EINV EZ CH BM IN PK AF VM CB
SUBJECT: CZECHS IN ASIA: CONTINUED FOCUS ON CHINA, BUT INCREASING ENGAGEMENT PLANNED IN INDIA, VIETNAM

REF: A. 05 PRAGUE 1023

¶B. 05 PRAGUE 1664

Classified By: Pol/Econ Chief Michael Dodman for reasons 1.4 b+d.

¶1. (C) Summary. The Czech Republic plans active engagement with East and South Asia in the first half of 2006, with most attention focused on China. During a visit to Prague in December, the Chinese PM closed an investment agreement that, according to critics, noticeably favors Chinese interests over Czech (and may violate EU rules). Several visits to China are being planned for the coming months, with the focus squarely on commercial issues; the Speaker of Parliament has floated the idea of a visit to Tibet as a means of drawing attention to human rights, but the proposal is likely to fail. PM Paroubek will visit India this month, on the heels of a visit by President Klaus; among the business deals the GOCR hopes to discuss is possible Indian purchase of a VERA radar system, which would be a counterweight to the system Pakistan is planning to acquire. Several leading Czech officials plan to visit Vietnam this year, and a visit to Prague by the Vietnamese PM is possible in the spring. President Karzai intends to visit Prague this year, as the Czechs contemplate increasing their engagement in Afghanistan. The Czech MFA continues to work with the North Koreans to define their relationship, and the Czechs will be pursuing the question of conditions for North Korean workers in the CR. Despite this flurry of activity, the Czech MFA admits it does not have a coherent Asia strategy, and hopes to coordinate this with the USG. End summary.

¶2. (C) Pol/Econ Counselor (serving as Charge) and Poloff met Jan 5 with Jan Fury, Czech MFA Director of Asia/Pacific Department, to review the December visit to Prague of Chinese PM Wen Jiabao, as well as on-going Czech discussions with North Korea. Fury provided an extensive overview of planned Czech engagement with countries in South and East Asia in 2006, indicating that the planned June Czech elections will not slow the pace of official travel involving PM Paroubek and senior Czech officials.

-----
China
-----

¶3. (C) The Chinese PM visited Prague Dec 8-9, 2005. The visit was designed to build on PM Paroubek´s June 2005 trip to China, which launched a sharp escalation in Czech-Chinese engagement (reftels). As expected, the Prague talks focused nearly exclusively on economic cooperation. Aside from the announcement of some small business deals, the big news from the visit -- the first by a Chinese PM to Prague since the Velvet Revolution -- was signature of a controversial investment agreement which, according to critics (including the Foreign Minister), is both overly preferential to the Chinese side and contravenes EU rules. According to Fury, Paroubek did not raise the human rights situation or IPR deficiencies in China, and neither side raised the EU arms embargo.

¶4. (C) Fury outlined a number of visits planned in the coming months. Speaker of Parliament Lubomir Zaoralek (CSSD) intends to visit China, as well as Hong Kong and Vietnam, in late January. Zaoralek´s agenda was not yet settled. Press reports indicated Zaoralek was considering trying to include a stop in Tibet on his itinerary, as a way of highlighting the human rights situation, but Fury expected this would not win approval from Beijing, and Zaoralek subsequently stated this is unlikely. (Comment: Zaoralek, however, can be expected to keep human rights on his agenda in Beijing, although Paroubek is likely to urge him to treat the issue lightly.) Deputy FM Basta has been invited to Beijing, and FM Svoboda is also contemplating a trip before the June Czech elections (possibly to include stops in Japan, Mongolia and Kazakhstan). Fury complained that the pace of visits was out of proportion to the actual amount of government-to-government work to be accomplished.

----------------
India & Pakistan
----------------

PRAGUE 00000046 002 OF 003



¶5. (C) The Czechs seek increased economic cooperation with India as well. PM Paroubek plans to travel to New Delhi and Calcutta the week of January 17, 2006. Paroubek will meet with Indian President and prominent Indian business leaders, and deliver a speech at a business conference. His visit follows a December trip to India by Czech President Klaus. According to Fury, Paroubek will not pursue any significant political topics during his visit, but (as in China) will focus almost exclusively on business. One topic likely to be raised is Indian interest in purchasing a version of the Czech-made VERA passive surveillance system. Fury said the Indian interest in the purchase is a result of Pakistan´s intention to also acquire the technology (note: Czech officials had approached us in 2004 regarding a possible VERA-E sale to India; the USG did not indicate objections to the sale, but there appear to have been no active discussions on an actual deal since then).

¶6. (SBU) Fury noted that Deputy FM Tomas Pojar will also travel to India and Pakistan in coming months. Further on Pakistan, the Czechs plan to airlift 11 Pakistani children to Prague in January to provide medical treatment, mostly for traumatic injuries, that cannot be provided in Pakistan.

-------------------------
Cambodia, Burma & Vietnam
-------------------------

¶6. (C) Although the Czechs do not have a mission in Cambodia, the MFA plan to host a Chiefs of Mission Conference in Cambodia March 11-15 to celebrate the 50th anniversary of Czech-Cambodian diplomatic relations. Relations between the Czechs and the Cambodians are very cordial thanks to King Sihanouk, affectionately known in Prague as the &Czech Prince8 because he is a fluent Czech speaker. Fury noted that he was interested in opening an embassy in Phnom Penh, but he doubted the MFA´s budget would permit this. He added that the MFA is also engaged in an internal debate on the wisdom of opening an embassy in Rangoon, with the issue there not so much money but the appropriate approach to take vis-a-vis the regime: to increase engagement with an embassy (which could facilitate Czech pro-democracy work), or
continue to isolate the regime.

¶7. (C) Czech visitors to Vietnam this year are likely to include Speaker Zaoralek, Deputy FM Pojar, and Minister of Trade and Industry Milan Urban. Fury said there is an invitation outstanding for Vietnamese PM Phan Van Khai to visit Prague before the June elections.

-----------
Afghanistan
-----------

¶8. (C) Turning to Afghanistan, Fury said President Hamid Karzai is expected to visit Prague this year. Fury had no details on the visit, only that it was not likely to be tied to the upcoming London conference on Afghanistan (note: the Afghan Ambassador in Prague is closely related to President Karzai, and this is a likely impetus for the possible visit). Fury noted that discussion was on-going within the MFA about
how and when to reopen their embassy in Kabul, which was important given the level of Czech engagement there. While no decision has been taken on a permanent mission, the MFA recently sent a dedicated Afghan-watcher to its mission in Islamabad. Fury noted that in addition to the GOCR decision to return Czech Special Forces to Iraq this year (approved Jan 11 by the cabinet, but still subject to parliamentary approval), the MFA and MOD are actively debating leading a PRT in Afghanistan (details septel).

--------------------------------
North Korean Workers & Relations
--------------------------------

¶9. (C) CDA informed Fury that the U.S. press has reported that North Korean women are laboring in the Czech Republic under poor working and living conditions. The women allegedly pay more than half their wages to the North Korean government, and then starve themselves so they will have

PRAGUE 00000046 003 OF 003


money for their families. CDA noted that the Embassy will be investigating the story and meeting with other Czech ministries, and urged the MFA to likewise investigate. Fury said he found the story disgusting and personally agreed that these sorts of labor contracts should not exist in the Czech Republic. Fury also said he would discuss the issue with the North Korean Ambassador during an upcoming meeting. At that meeting, Fury promised that the MFA would be raising the need for progress in the six-party talks, and investigating steps that the two governments could take to improve cooperation in previously agreed humanitarian areas -- for instance, movement on a Czech proposal to bring a North Korean children´s choir to the CR. He added that Pyongyang was interested in having him visit for further talks, but he saw no need for a visit absent signs of progress on previous proposals.

-------------
Asia Strategy
-------------

¶10. (C) Fury admitted that one surprise in his few months on the job has been the lack of an agreed GOCR Asia "strategy." He would like to coordinate with the USG on development of such a document. We will follow-up with Fury on specific ideas (and provide publicly available USG documents) during a subsequent meeting.
CABANISS


____________________
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 PRAGUE 000095, CREATED: 2006-01-27

SIPDIS

NOFORN
SIPDIS

STATE FOR EUR/NCE, PM/RSAT FOR FORTIN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/23/2016
TAGS: ETTC EZ KSTC PARM PREL PTER
SUBJECT: VERA-E SYSTEM: CZECH MOD HARDLINERS WANT TO TALK

REF: 2005 STATE 174893

Classified By: Acting DCM Michael Dodman for reasons 1.5 (b) & (d)

¶1. (U) This is an action request, please see paragraphs 13 and 14.

¶2. (S/NF) Summary. In a significant change from previous practice, the Armaments Division of the Czech Ministry of Defense has broken its silence towards the U.S. on its views about sales of the VERA-E passive surveillance detection system. Through contacts, we knew the Armaments Division has consistently supported increased exports of Czech passive surveillance technology. That office had been the only key player unwilling to discuss VERA-E with U.S. officials. The Armaments Division has now approached us with specific questions about the consistency of U.S. concerns over Czech arms sales to countries that have already purchased U.S. arms. In support of their position the Czechs are now citing China´s efforts to develop its own passive surveillance technology. Seeking to end U.S. objections to VERA sales, the Armaments Division has also proposed a more positive step: greater U.S.- Czech technical collaboration in the field of passive surveillance. Embassy Prague seeks guidance on the proposal in para 13 and the appropriate response to the questions contained in para 14. End summary.

¶3. (U) DATT, ODC Deputy, and PolOff met January 27 with: Josef Taborsky, Senior Program Manager, MOD Armaments Division; and Richard Macha, Lt Col Lubor Koudleka, and Josef Stastny, of the MOD´s International Relations Branch.


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ARE YOU AMERICANS CONSISTENT?
SHOW US HOW YOU HANDLE YOUR OWN ARMS SALES
--- - --- - --- - --- - --- - --- - --- -

¶4. (S/NF) Leading the meeting for the Czech side, International Relations Branch Director Macha said that the Armaments Division (and the MOD generally) would like general information about the licensing scheme for U.S. military technology exports. He also said the MOD would like to consult with the United States on concrete examples of such transfers. Accordingly the MOD asked for the text of a real-world agreement covering a U.S. technology export that would prevent the misuse of sensitive U.S. technologies by third parties. As a suggested case, the Czechs gave the example of Pakistan´s acquisition of the P-3 Orion, equipped with the AN/ALR66C electronic support measures system and the EP2060 pulse analyzer. The MOD would like to examine provisions within the agreement that prevent proliferation of the technology to China.

¶5. (S/NF) DATT acknowledged the already-close cooperation between the U.S. and the Czech Republic on selecting appropriate destinations for VERA, noting the United States placed great value on the Czechs´ willingness to consult with us on our strategic interests before making a decision on a sale. In response to Macha´s first question, DATT and PolOff outlined the work of the State Department´s Directorate of Defense Trade Controls, and the consultative role of the interagency community. Emboffs did not address the idea of providing a sample of an agreement covering a U.S. military-technology transfer.


--- - --- -
LETS COLLABORATE
--- - --- -

¶6. (S/NF) Macha said the MOD would be interested in working closely with U.S. technical experts to establish the parameters for a downgraded version of the VERA-E system, one which would be appropriate for export to non-NATO countries: "Our main goal is to ask our more knowledgeable partner how to do it." The MOD would also like to invite a technical team to the Czech Republic to jointly address the adequacy of nonproliferation countermeasures in their passive surveillance systems. Macha said such a team could choose to

PRAGUE 00000095 002 OF 003


demonstrate U.S. concerns about proliferation to third countries by breaking/overcoming the countermeasures currently present in the ASDD-01 system. In addition to technical meetings, the MOD would welcome agreement of a way forward at upcoming U.S. Czech Pol-Mil talks, notionally scheduled for the spring (Note: dates for these talks have not yet been finalized. End note.).

¶7. (S/NF) Taborsky spoke at length about the loss of Czech sales due to the Czechs voluntary desire to protect U.S. strategic interests. He said Ukraine had been quick to sell the Kolchuga system to countries that had sought the Czech ASDD-01 and been denied. Macha further mentioned that China was now developing its own passive surveillance detection system and wondered to us whether it would be better to allow China to arm itself with the VERA-E, a known system, rather than with a system with unknown operating characteristics and capabilities. DATT responded that the United States was interested in the Czechs maintaining their hi-tech defense industry, and the USG realized that the brains behind this cutting edge technology would best be kept gainfully employed at ERA, where they would be less vulnerable to financial offers from potentially-hostile countries seeking to buy their knowledge.

¶8. (S/NF) Taborsky presented a Czech idea for collaboration between the United States and the Czech Republic on developing future technology in this field. He suggested the creation of a joint U.S. DOD - Czech MOD research and development project, with funding from both governments. When the DATT and ODC Deputy clarified that the private sector takes the lead in developing military technology for the United States, the Czechs responded that they would also welcome a joint venture involving a U.S. firm.

¶9. (S/NF) DATT noted the United States would soon provide the MOD with a letter outlining the test results for the U.S-owned VERA-E system. Such information would assist the Czechs in their marketing efforts to countries that were the most appropriate destinations (understood by both sides to be NATO allies and other aligned countries such as Australia). While welcoming the idea of a letter as a positive step, Taborsky said there had been little interest in the VERA-E among NATO allies and it would be good to see the United States´ high regard for the VERA-E system demonstrated by further U.S. orders.

--- - --- - --- - --- - --- -
WHO ARE THE POTENTIAL BUYERS THESE DAYS?
--- - --- - --- - --- - --- -

10 (S/NF) PolOff asked Macha which countries were currently considered potential customers for either the ASDD-01 or VERA-E systems. Macha responded that only one country, Pakistan, was considered a current case. (Note: ERA (the manufacturer) had applied to the MOD for a preliminary opinion on a sale of one downgraded system to Pakistan. ERA had previously been granted permission for a 6-month lease to Pakistan, but that license had been abandoned because Pakistan had chosen to buy the system instead and would need a new license (ref A)). Macha said the MOD would advise ERA that it would not render an opinion on the case until after further discussion with the U.S. in the Spring. PolOff asked about rumors that India and Malaysia were interested in new purchases. Macha indicated it would also be helpful to learn U.S. opinion about a transfer to Malaysia (Note: We do not/not consider this a formal request. See para 15). Macha also said there had been interest from Greece and Australia. ¶11. (S/NF) (Comment:) We are at a point of danger and opportunity. The MOD´s Armaments Division, which has been deeply cynical about U.S. motives for blocking VERA exports, has decided to try to move beyond a status quo that does not allow for widespread sales. From their perspective, any change is good. If we cannot show them that the United States has deployed effective methods to prevent proliferation of our own technology, then the Armaments Division will argue within the GOCR that U.S. decision-making is driven more by economic concerns than strategic ones. Under such circumstances they would argue that the Czechs should be no more accommodating to U.S. strategic concerns than the U.S.

PRAGUE 00000095 003 OF 003

is itself. That line of reasoning could win converts within the GOCR, even though it willfully makes incorrect assumptions about the equivalency of U.S. and Czech military systems in the field of passive surveillance.


¶12. (S/NF) (Comment continued) In terms of the proposed collaboration. VERA´s supporters in the Czech Republic feel the U.S. could have no objection to the sale of a system with characteristics that were defined by a joint U.S.-Czech team. They do acknowledge the difficulty of downgrading a system to the extent that it eliminates U.S. strategic concerns without leaving the resulting platform so ineffective that there is no market interest. Any future U.S. collaboration with the Czechs in developing next-generation technology would do much to relieve the political pressure within the GOCR to authorize sales to countries that are of concern to the United States.

¶13. (S/NF) (Action request) Robust engagement with the Czechs on these topics will be crucial to preserving their political willingness to pre-clear VERA and ASDD-01 sales with the United States. This summer will likely see the arrival of new defense and foreign ministers and the departure for a new assignment of the head of the MFA´s licensing department, who has been very supportive of U.S. positions. New incumbents in these positions, and in the GOCR generally, may need to be convinced that the Czech defense industry´s jewel in the crown should continue to forgo tens of millions of dollars of business because of U.S. strategic interests. Post recommends acceptance of the Czech offer for collaboration of technical experts on counterproliferation measures mentioned in para 6. The U.S. has already confirmed it would "welcome further dialogue and cooperation with the Czech Republic on the specific capabilities and the licensing conditions or provisos of the ASDD-01 to be sold to Pakistan, as well as any other safeguard measures employed to protect the technology." (ref A)

14 (S/NF) (Action request continued) Post further requests: A) The Department provide a response to the Czech´s question surrounding the P-3 Orion transfer to Pakistan mentioned in para 4. B) A statement of the U.S. position regarding the Czech´s suggestion for collaboration on joint development of next-generation military technologies (para 8). (End action request)

¶15. (S/NF) (Comment continued) While the MOD is interested in learning U.S. opinion about a possible sale to Malaysia, we do not believe that our answer to this theoretical case would do more than arm our critics with more examples of U.S. opposition to a sale. The MOD is not the guardian of the consultative mechanism worked out between the GOCR and the United States. That function rests with the MFA, and Post will seek confirmation that the GOCR would like a formal opinion on a Malaysia sale. If such a request is made, the way in which we deliver our (likely negative) response must form part of our engagement on the issues raised above. Post recommends the Department solicit interagency opinion on a Malaysia case only when the Czech MFA formally requests such an opinion and only as part of an integrated response that will keep the consultative process alive. (End comment)
DODMAN


____________________
S E C R E T PRAGUE 000283, CREATED: 2006-03-17

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR EUR/NCE, PM/RSAT FOR FORTIN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/16/2016
TAGS: AF EZ NATO PARM PREL PTER ETTC KSTC MASS
SUBJECT: CZECH DEFENSE MINISTER ON VERA-E, AFGHAN PRT, AND MISSILE DEFENSE

Classified By: Acting DCM Michael Dodman for reasons 1.4 (b) & (d)

¶1. (S) Summary: Ambassador met March 14 with Czech Defense
Minister Karel Kuehnl to present the letter from SECDEF Rumsfeld on the positive results of U.S. testing of the VERA-E passive surveillance detection system. Afghanistan and missile defense were also discussed. Kuehnl welcomed the SECDEF´s letter but said that actual sales of the VERA-E would be important in the future. Kuehnl was not as optimistic as the MFA on plans for a Czech-led PRT, but was careful to say that the Ministry of Defense would not be a roadblock. Kuehnl also said he was open to talks on missile defense in the coming months, but cautioned that the discussion should be kept low-profile until after the June election; he said that Prime Minister Paroubek could distance himself from missile defense if it were to become an electoral liability. End summary.

--------------------------------------
VERA-E: U.S. SEAL-OF-APPROVAL WELCOME
BUT CZECHS SAY MORE SALES ARE NEEDED
--------------------------------------

¶2. (C) Kuehnl welcomed SECDEF Rumsfeld´s favorable letter on the VERA-E, saying the Czech Republic never had doubts about the system´s technical capabilities. He agreed with the Ambassador that such a document would be useful in marketing the system to allies. However the Minister observed that the Czech Republic´s industrial and social policies were taking a back seat to national security policy on this issue. He said praise of the system would not be enough. Failure of the VERA to become commercially successful would lead to a "grave" domestic political problem. Kuehnl said he is committed to maintaining the superiority of allies, and not making them more vulnerable. He hoped with the help of the United States the Czechs could find ways to make Czech passive surveillance technology less of a proliferation threat and therefore more exportable. The Minister asked that the Ambassador communicate the Czech request for practical measures to Washington for action. The Ambassador responded that Washington was aware and engaged, as the letter from SECDEF Rumsfeld indicated. He said he understood the Minister´s concerns from both an economic and a political standpoint, and assured Kuehnl the United States is grateful for Czech cooperation on the VERA-E issue.

-------------------------------
MOD ON FORMING A CZECH-LED PRT:
VERY HARD BUT NOT IMPOSSIBLE
-------------------------------

¶3. (C) The Ambassador shared with Kuehnl the United States´ favorable reactions to Czech interest in leading a Provincial Reconstruction Team in Afghanistan, adding that the U.S. would be prepared to help the Czechs identify potential partner allies with the right capabilities. Kuehnl said discussion of the issue was premature. Initially taking a very negative tone, Kuehnl individually listed most of the Czech Republic´s ongoing deployments as evidence that the Czech armed forces have more troops deployed than current doctrine allows. However, Kuehnl went on to say he was not prepared to rule out a PRT. He said the Ministry of Defense could go forward but that the problem was political. Creation of a Czech PRT would need the approval of both chambers of Parliament. Additionally, an effective PRT would require civilian programs from other ministries, which had not prepared plans for how they might contribute.

-------------------------------------
MISSILE DEFENSE CONSULTATIONS:
THE JUNE ELECTION MAKES THIS DELICATE
-------------------------------------

¶4. (S) Kuehnl and the Ambassador also touched on the future of discussions on missile defense. Kuehnl agreed there had been several years of cooperation on the issue, but cautioned that the pre-election period was a politically delicate time for any work that might hit the press. He warned that (highly-pragmatic) Prime Minister Jiri Paroubek could distance himself from missile defense if it were to become an electoral liability. Kuehnl said the Ministry of Defense is interested in further talks but any work on the issue should not/not be made public before the election. He suggested that talk on missile defense be packaged as part of wider discussions on political and military matters. Kuehnl said that he saw no problem with private briefings to NATO allies or Russia on missile defense.

--------
COMMENT:
--------

¶5. (C) Kuehnl´s position on increased VERA-E system sales is a reflection of rising pressure within the GOCR to authorize more exports of this technology. The Minister believes there is scope for more bilateral U.S.-Czech cooperation on this issue.

¶6. (C) The PRT question continues to cause divisions in Prague. The MFA is a promoter of the idea, the Minister of Defense appears agnostic and aware of the costs, while most of the MOD policy staff believe the Czechs cannot mount this kind of operation. It is encouraging that Kuehnl is not prepared to allow the MOD to become a bottleneck on the road to a PRT. However, his days in this job are numbered (Note: Kuehnl´s party is unlikely to make it into parliament after the June 2 election End note). It is an open question whether a Czech PRT can be planned during the life of this government for approval by the next.

¶7. (S) Kuehnl is not alone in seeing missile defense as a delicate matter. All parties in the coalition government are in full campaign mode. He is prepared to go ahead with consultations in the interests of international cooperation with a close ally, but is clearly focused on the possible political threats to Czech involvement in the missile defense program if the issue becomes a political football.
CABANISS


____________________
C O N F I D E N T I A L PRAGUE 001350, CREATED: 2006-10-30



SIPDIS

NOFORN
SIPDIS

EUR/NCE FOR FICHTE, PM FOR DOWLEY, OSD FOR SADOWSKA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/29/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREL EZ MARR MASS MCAP
SUBJECT: U.S. COMPANY BUYS MANUFACTURER OF VERA-E PASSIVE SURVEILLANCE SYSTEM


Classified By: Political Counselor Michael Dodman for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

¶1. (U) This cable contains sensitive business information. Please protect accordingly.

¶2. (C/NF) Summary: Representatives of Rannoch Corporation, a Virginia-based company specializing in air traffic control (ATC) technology, purchased Czech company ERA A.S. on October ¶26. The new owners plan to quadruple production capacity for the VERA-E in the first year, and state that this new capacity would be aimed at supplying only the U.S., NATO allies, and "responsible countries" that are acceptable to the USG. Rannoch hopes to hold on to ERA for no longer than two to three years. Rannoch executives say they place a high priority on USG relations, thus avoiding factors that could make prospective U.S. purchasers of the company less likely to buy them out. End summary.

¶3. (SBU) Representatives of Rannoch Corporation, a Virginia-based company specializing in air traffic control (ATC) technology, met with members of Embassy Prague on October 25 to provide details of their planned takeover of ERA, the manufacturer of the VERA passive surveillance system. (Note: ERA confirmed on October 27 that the purchase had been successfully concluded. End note). Rannoch´s President David A. Ellison and Chief Financial Officer John ¶D. Young, described ERA´s civilian air traffic control equipment as a world leader, and said that Rannoch´s acquisition of ERA, its main competitor, would mean increased success in civilian airport air traffic control tenders.

¶4. (SBU) Turning to military systems, Ellison also expressed Rannoch´s interest in expanding production of the VERA, because of the increased margins on military technology compared to the highly competitive civilian market. Ellison said ERA is currently only able to produce four VERA systems per year. Based on Rannoch´s previous marketing efforts in the U.S., Rannoch executives foresee potential for further U.S. and allied VERA purchases, possibly for non-traditional applications such as military testing and homeland security. However, current orders from Pakistan mean that ERA´s order books would be full for some time. Ellison said Rannoch plans to initiate a shift-based system, initially doubling production capacity to four systems every six months before increasing capacity again within a year to allow ERA to produce 16 VERA systems per year. Rannoch is currently also looking at purchasing the Czech Ministry of Defense´s share of the intellectual property rights in the VERA system.

¶5. (SBU) Both executives said that Rannoch would like to avoid dealings with shady arms exporters and would thus immediately undertake a review of ERA´s business partners in the area of international marketing. As a part of this strategy, Rannoch intended to buy out Czech exporter Omnipol´s holding in ERA.

¶6. (SBU) Ellison also claimed that Rannoch would want to ensure good relations with the U.S. Government. He volunteered to send the Embassy a list of the countries currently being considered by ERA as potential buyers of the VERA system. Ellison noted that ERA seemed to have several deals in the works considering VERA sales. In response to a question from Ellison, Poloff explained that the governments generally cannot share details of any classified discussions that may take place between governments about licensing arms exports (Note: It is an open secret in Prague that U.S. security concerns are the reason the Czech Government has refused to license several VERA sales. End note.) However, Poloff also warned that several of the Czech companies marketing VERA around the world had failed to get an export license from the Czech authorities due to Czech foreign policy concerns. Ellison and Young both were at pains to point out that any poor relations with the United States Government could hurt them financially: Rannoch sees its
investment as only a short to medium-term involvement with ERA, ideally lasting about two years. They hope that one of the large U.S. defense firms will want to buy ERA after Rannoch demonstrates the real worth of the company. They said ERA would be less appealing to a buyer if it came with the baggage of strained relations with Washington. However, Ellison did assert that VERA was not unique, and mentioned that one of his Internet searches had turned up a Chinese claim to have developed a similar system.

-------
COMMENT
-------
¶7. (C/NF) It appears Rannoch´s purchase of ERA could lead to a paradigm shift in the way the USG prevents the VERA system from falling into the wrong hands. If Rannoch turns out to be genuinely committed to prioritizing USG relations over questionable sales, the United States may have the option to prevent future problems even before the company begins talking to the wrong prospective customers. Because Rannoch is incorporated in the U.S., there is also the possibility of the VERA now falling fully within the jurisdiction of U.S. defense export licensing controls. From a bilateral relations perspective such an outcome would be very favorable. If Rannoch only applied for a Czech export license after receiving a U.S. license, there would no longer be any U.S. requests for license refusals in Prague, and the U.S. Government might no longer be seen as a barrier to the success of a prominent Czech company. Such an outcome would also reduce political pressure on pro-U.S. officials in the Czech government who have often stood in the way of attempts to send VERA to inappropriate destination countries. GRABER


____________________
S E C R E T PRAGUE 001398, CREATED: 2006-11-09

SIPDIS

NOFORN
SIPDIS

EUR/NCE FOR FICHTE, PM FOR DOWLEY, OSD FOR SADOWSKA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/08/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREL EZ MARR MASS MCAP NI EC ID VM
SUBJECT: CZECH MFA SOLICITS INFORMAL U.S. OPINION ON FOUR VERA/TAMARA/BORAP DEALS

REF: PRAGUE 1350

Classified By: Political Counselor Michael Dodman for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

¶1. (S/NF) Summary: The Czech Government is considering granting permission for Czech export companies to begin to negotiate sales of several radar and similar systems to Indonesia, Ecuador, Nigeria, and Vietnam. If future applications are made for export licenses for the VERA, the Czech MFA intends to work with the United States to reach a decision. End summary.

¶2. (S/NF) Poloff met October 26 with Czech MFA Common Foreign Security and Policy Director Vaclav Balek to discuss exports of sensitive Czech military technology. Balek shared that the Czech Government is considering issuing a preliminary opinion on applications from several (unnamed) Czech export companies
to negotiate sales of radar and/or passive surveillance technology to Indonesia, Ecuador, Nigeria, and Vietnam. Balek highlighted that these were not formal license applications but were instead "preliminary applications for the start of negotiations with partners." He was keen to point out that these applications were subject to a degree of uncertainty. The applications indicated neither a destination country´s
definite interest in purchasing a system nor that an eventual export license application would be approved by the Czech Government.

¶3. (S/NF) Balek said that any future exports of the VERA would be subject to a range of nonproliferation controls, including the incorporation of chips that would cause the system to self-destruct if operated outside of the destination country. (Note: We believe that applications to purchase the "VERA" refer to the slightly limited ASDD-01 version of the system that is normally offered to non-NATO countries. End note.) Balek outlined the following requests and probable Czech Government decisions:

Indonesia: VERA
- likely to grant permission for preliminary negotiations

Ecuador: VERA
- likely to grant permission for preliminary negotiations

Nigeria: Tamara
- likely to grant permission for preliminary negotiations

Vietnam: VERA or Tamara or BORAP.
- likely to refuse permission for preliminary negotiations on VERA and Tamara
- likely to grant permission for preliminary negotiations on BORAP.

(Note: While the VERA and the BORAP are manufactured by ERA a.s., Balek guessed that the Tamara systems in question were manufactured by Tesla Pardubice for delivery to France in the early 1990s. That deal had fallen apart in a price dispute, leaving two unsold systems in the Czech Republic. End note)

¶4. (S/NF) Balek said that, if the U.S. had an opinion on sales to these particular destination countries, it would be helpful for the Czechs to hear the U.S. side early in the process. Poloff reminded Balek that USG opposition to a VERA transfer to Vietnam was unlikely to change. Balek agreed, indicating that this was a primary reason for the Czechs´ likely refusal to authorize commercial negotiations on the purchase of a VERA. (Note: There is currently no agreement committing the Czech Government to consult with the U.S. over surveillance systems other than the VERA. However our cooperation on other arms exports suggests that the Czech MFA could be receptive to clearly articulated U.S. concerns about other systems. End note.)

-------
COMMENT
-------
¶5. (S/NF) As noted above, the VERA and BORAP are manufactured by ERA a.s., based in Pardubice, Czech Republic. These applications all predate the October 26 purchase of ERA by Rannoch, a U.S. firm (Reftel). All of the applications were made by Czech export companies specializing in military material, rather than ERA itself. It remains to be seen if Rannoch would back these export companies and support further
negotiations with these destination countries. Regardless of Rannoch´s opinion, if the VERA now falls within the jurisdiction of U.S. defense export licensing controls, the USG will have a useful tool at its disposal to ensure that VERAs are not sent to the wrong countries.
¶6. (S/NF) Pending resolution of the issues raised by the Rannoch acquisition of ERA, the Czech MFA must still rule on the current applications to negotiate with these four destination countries. Post has already made it clear to the Czechs that the USG remains opposed to a transfer to Vietnam. The Czech MFA did not/not make a formal request with a 30-day timeline for a final USG opinion on any of these destination countries (Note: For an actual marketing or export license application involving the VERA, the USG has committed to providing the Czech Government with its opinion within 30 days. End note). The Czech MFA´s decision to consult with the Embassy at so early a stage provides an opportunity to stop problematic negotiations before they begin in earnest. There is no history of the Czech Republic consulting the U.S. on
BORAP or the Tamara and this may be our only chance to intervene in those cases. If a USG opinion on the appropriateness of these destination countries is not easily available in Washington, Post will make it clear to the Czechs that the USG will be able to provide a formal and timely response on the VERA cases if negotiations lead to an actual application for a license. We will also note that we are also considering the implications of the Rannoch acquisition of ERA.
GRABER
URL : https://www.valka.cz/CZE-Vera-S-M-pasivni-sledovaci-system-t22532#453790Verze : 0
MOD
Anténní jednotka AN-17 s logistickou kontejnerovou skříňovou karoserií kompletu Věra S/M z výzbroje 532. praporu elektronického boje, cvičení Unified Vision 2018, červen 2018. Cvičení Unified Vision 2018 se uskutečnilo ve dnech 4. až 28. června 2018 s cílem ověřit naplnění schopností interoperability sil a prostředků zpravodajství, průzkumu a elektronického boje v možných společných operacích Severoatlantické aliance. Do cvičení se zapojily armády 17 států NATO, Finska a Švédska.
CZE - Věra S/M (pasivní sledovací systém) - (US DoD)

(US DoD)
URL : https://www.valka.cz/CZE-Vera-S-M-pasivni-sledovaci-system-t22532#602482Verze : 2
MOD
Věras S/M rozvinutá na vrchu Radhošť, v susedstve kaple sv. Cyrila a Metoda, 15.09.2019. Podľa použitého podvozku antény ide o súčasť prvého kompletu Věra S/M dodaného AČR.

Zdroj: vlastné foto

CZE - Věra S/M (pasivní sledovací systém) - Věra S/M

Věra S/M
Zveřejněno s laskavým svolením autora

CZE - Věra S/M (pasivní sledovací systém) - Věra S/M

Věra S/M
Zveřejněno s laskavým svolením autora

URL : https://www.valka.cz/CZE-Vera-S-M-pasivni-sledovaci-system-t22532#626892Verze : 1
MOD